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INTRODUCTION 
From President Barack Obama and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton to The New York Times, the popular perception of 
medical apology programs is that they are wonderful things.1  
These programs call on doctors who have committed an error to 
meet with their injured patient, explain why the mistakes 
happened and apologize accordingly.  Taken in isolation, the 
concept of a doctor admitting his or her unintended error to a 
harmed patient seems appropriate, humanitarian, and fair.  This 
Article explains, however, why their perceived nobility is based 
on a myth.2  In reality, the design of medical apology programs 
allows for the manipulation of injured patients as a means to 
persuade them not to pursue money damages. 
A phenomenon called “cooling the mark out” that was first 
noted in 1952 by the famed sociologist Erving Goffman, explains 
how apology programs work.3  Goffman observed that “confidence 
men” use a tried-and-true set of techniques to convince (or “cool 
out”) their victim (or “mark”) not to complain after realizing that 
he or she had been swindled.4  Goffman wrote that cooling the 
mark out also has uses in contexts beyond criminal enterprises.5  
When it does happen in law-abiding society, it uses similar 
processes in which a person in a position of power uses 
persuasive methods to control the emotional state of a mark.6  
The intended effect remains to diffuse the mark’s righteous anger 
to the con’s benefit.7  This Article argues that medical apology 
 
 1 See Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the 
Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2207 (2006); Kevin 
Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Long Before ‘See You in Court,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2008, at A1. 
 2 The sources on this topic use the terms “disclosure program” and “apology 
program” interchangeably.  Ultimately, disclosure programs—where a medical provider 
simply discloses that an error occurred—do not necessarily have to include an apology.  
However, for strategic reasons, doctors are nearly universally counseled to apologize for 
acts of negligence at the time of their disclosure.  As a reason for doing so, CRICO/RMF 
(the insurer that covers physicians at Harvard’s hospitals) explained that the disclosure 
should include an apology “because an apology is often equated with the showing of 
empathy, a communication that lacks this basic ‘human touch’ may actually make a 
situation much worse.” CRICO/RMF, Disclosure and Apology:  CRICO’s Perspective, 
CRICO/RMF (last visited July 1, 2011), http://www.rmf.harvard.edu/files/documents/ 
2003WhitePaper--DisclosureApology.pdf [hereinafter CRICO’s Perspective].  For the sake 
of ease, this paper will refer to these programs as “apology programs” except in the 
context of quotations from other sources that use the term “disclosure” with identical 
intention. 
 3 Erving Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure, 
15 PSYCHIATRY 451, 452 (1952). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 455. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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programs engage in cooling the mark out.  The goal of hospitals 
that use them is, of course, not to prevent a victim from reporting 
a crooked game of dice or three-card monte to the police.  Instead, 
modern apology programs appear to cool their marks out as a 
means of preventing them from speaking to a lawyer and 
becoming educated about their legal rights. 
This Article unfolds in five parts.  Part I presents a brief 
history of apology programs, including their genesis as a 
calculated attempt to soften the blow from regulatory 
requirements that forced physicians and institutions to report 
events of malpractice.  Part II develops a typology of the different 
forms of disclosure programs that have evolved, each of which 
has become more efficiently designed to restrict a malpractice 
victim’s ability to recover.  Part III demonstrates how the current 
application of medical apology programs is consistent with 
Goffman’s sociological work on cooling the mark out, as well as 
psychological research on methods of influencing decisions 
through apologies.  Part IV of the Article explains how apology 
programs create outcomes that are inconsistent with the tort 
system by influencing patients to receive less compensation than 
the law entitles them.  Part V suggests remedies for the problems 
created by those who have designed medical apology programs. 
I.  THE STORY OF DISCLOSURE PROGRAMS 
While proponents of apology programs typically claim that 
they exist to fulfill an ethical necessity, their creation was far 
more practical: they were formed as a response to regulatory 
requirements.8  The impetus occurred in 1999, when researchers 
at the Institute of Medicine determined that as many as 98,000 
Americans die every year as a result of preventable medical 
errors.9  Before that time, apology programs were virtually 
 
 8 See CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2, (advocating disclosure because it is the 
“right thing to do”);; ECRI Inst., Disclosure of Unanticipated Outcomes, INCIDENT & 
REPORTING MGMT. 5, at 2 (Jan. 2008), available at https://www.ecri.org/Documents/ 
Patient_Safety_Center/HRC_Disclosure_Unanticipated_Events_0108.pdf (describing 
disclosure as “appropriate,” “ethical,” and “the right thing to do”). 
 9 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 31 (2000).  
Subsequent research indicates this figure just scratches the surface of the amount of 
malpractice that actually occurs.  For example, one study found that about 15 million 
incidents of medical harm—unintended physical injury resulting from medical care—
occur annually in the United States. C. Joseph McCannon et al., Miles to Go: An 
Introduction to the 5 Million Lives Campaign, 33 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & 
PATIENT SAFETY 477, 479 (Aug. 2007).  A 2011 study funded by the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement found that as many as thirty-three percent of all inpatient stays 
involve malpractice. David C. Classen et al., ‘Global Trigger Tool’ Shows that Adverse 
Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH 
AFF. 581, 584 (2011).  This result is consistent with research results from a federally 
sponsored United States Department of Health and Human Services study and may, even 
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unheard of in hospitals.10  However, the shocking figures 
catalyzed medical regulators to seek ways to improve patient 
safety.  One effect was that, in 2001, the nation’s largest hospital 
accrediting organization, the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations,11 published a new set of patient 
safety standards.12  These standards required medical 
practitioners to disclose all “unanticipated outcomes,” including 
malpractice, to patients.13  The cost for failing to disclose errors 
was steep; facilities whose practitioners did not comply could lose 
Joint Commission accreditation, effectively putting them out of 
business.14   
The Joint Commission’s transparency rules caused fear 
among physicians, risk managers at hospital facilities and 
insurance executives.15  They were concerned that, if patients 
learned of acts of malpractice they would not otherwise know 
about, they would then have a basis to seek compensation for 
their injuries.16 
 
still, underrate the amount of malpractice because it is based only on record review and 
experience has proven that “not all adverse events are documented in the patient record.” 
Id. at 586. 
 10 See ROBERT D. TRUOG ET AL., TALKING WITH PATIENTS AND FAMILIES ABOUT 
MEDICAL ERROR 52–56 (2011) (explaining the rise of apology programs in the United 
States); Nancy Lamo, Disclosure of Medical Errors: The Right Thing to Do, but What is 
the Cost?, LOCKTON COS., LLC 2 (Winter 2011), available at http://www.lockton.com/ 
Resource_/PageResource/MKT/disclosure%20of%20medical%20errors.pdf (describing the 
cultural shift from deny-and-defend to disclosure at some healthcare organizations).  See 
also Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims?  The 
University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 125, 131 (2009) (recounting 
shift from “deny and defend” to transparency after medical errors). 
 11 Formerly referred to as “JCAHO,” this Article will refer to the organization by its 
current commonly used moniker, the “Joint Commission.” 
 12 See JOINT COMM’N, REVISIONS TO JOINT COMMISSION STANDARDS IN SUPPORT OF 
PATIENT SAFETY AND MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE ERROR REDUCTION (2001). 
 13 Id.  The American Medical Association articulated a similar position, stating that 
a physician is ethically required to inform the patient when faced with “significant 
medical complications that may have resulted from the physician’s mistake or judgment.” 
AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 
(1997), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/ 
code-medical-ethics/opinion812.page. 
 14 The Joint Commission is the nation’s largest hospital accreditor, certifying more 
than 19,000 United States medical facilities. About The Joint Commission, 
JOINTCOMMISSION.ORG (last visited July 27, 2011), http://www.jointcommission.org/ 
about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx.  Accreditation by the Joint Commission 
or other certifying body is a necessary step before a medical provider can receive 
payments from Medicare. See 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2010). 
 15 Ed Lovern, JCAHO’s New Tell-All; Standards Require that Patients Know About 
Below-Par Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 1, 2001, at 2 (“The challenge, of course, will be 
what liabilities [the Joint Commission’s disclosure requirement] may place upon the 
hospitals and practitioners” given our litigious society, said Greg Wise, M.D., Vice 
President of Medical Integration at 410-bed Kettering (Ohio) Medical Center).   
 16 See Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National 
Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73, 76 (2003) (finding physicians’ primary concern about 
disclosing errors is increased litigation); Albert Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is 
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With these changes hanging over them, the medical-
insurance industry began using its resources to try to protect 
itself from being held financially accountable for medical errors.  
Industry lobbyists exerted influence on lawmakers to create 
special medical apology shield laws: if a patient chooses not to 
accept an apology in lieu of money damages, the doctor’s apology 
can never be mentioned in court and the doctor can behave as if 
he never made the mistake to which he or she admitted.17  With 
few legislators or members of the public stopping to ask how 
these laws will affect injured patients, medical apology shield 
laws have taken hold in thirty-four states and the District of 
Columbia.18 
The apology shield laws come in a variety of forms.  Some 
protect a doctor from allowing a jury to learn about only the 
apology itself, some protect the doctor from a jury learning that 
the doctor has admitted fault, and some protect both.19  
Ultimately, however, each of the versions mean that a doctor can 
make statements related to malpractice and if the patient still 
wishes to pursue money damages in court, the jury would not be 
able to learn about it.  Financially, they mean that as long as 
patients do not ask for money, doctors are willing to take 
responsibility; but when a malpractice victim seeks a legal 
remedy, the doctor is then free to deny responsibility.  As one 
commentator noted, the rationale for these types of laws exposes 
the motivations of those that push for them: 
One might wonder why physicians and hospitals would seek special 
protection under the law for being honest with their patients about 
errors and mistakes.  One obvious answer to this question is money, 
in particular insurance company money.  Every doctor and hospital in 
Massachusetts is insured for damage done by their mistakes.  Some 
 
Disclosure the Best Defense, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 970, 971 (1999) (“Full disclosure 
could certainly provide an otherwise uninformed patient with a basis for litigation.”). 
 17 Insurance companies often either employ or foster close ties with lobbyists to sway 
court rules in their favor. See, e.g., Affiliations, GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE (July 12, 2011, 
8:35 AM), http://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/affiliations-endorsements.aspx (listing 
seven lobbyist affiliates); Endorsements, GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE (July 12, 2011, 8:35 
AM), http://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/affiliations-endorsements.aspx (listing three 
lobbyist groups that endorse Gallagher Healthcare insurance agency); MED. LIABILITY 
MUTUAL INS. COMPANY, http://www.mlmic.com/portal (last visited July 12, 2011) 
(“MLMIC is a respected voice in the State legislature and advocates on behalf of its 
policyholders on liability insurance and tort reform matters.”);; Political Advocacy, THE 
DOCTORS COMPANY (July 12, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.thedoctors.com/ 
KnowledgeCenter/PoliticalAdvocacy/index.htm (explaining The Doctors Company’s use of 
political action committees to advocate and defend tort reform).  
 18 Anna C. Mastroianni et al., The Flaws in State ‘Apology’ and ‘Disclosure’ Laws 
Dilute Their Intended Impact on Malpractice Suits, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1611, 1612 (2010) 
(reporting thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have medical apology shield 
laws). 
 19 Id. at 1611 (describing different forms of apology shield laws). 
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insurance companies and risk managers believe, based on studies, 
that if there are more apologies and admissions of mistakes by health 
care providers, fewer people will pursue their legal rights, and 
insurers will have to pay fewer claims.  Thus, [apology shield laws] 
allow medical providers to apologize and admit mistakes so long as 
they do not have to admit those mistakes when it costs their insurer 
money.  [Apology shield laws] are bad policy, unnecessary and should 
not be enacted as they tend to hide the truth from the judicial system, 
while giving health care and providers a free pass to “admit” to 
mistakes without taking any responsibility for them.20 
But apology shield laws are not the only measure hospitals 
employ that lessen the potential financial exposure created by 
disclosure requirements.  More significantly, many insurers and 
hospital risk management departments have created protocols 
for doctors to make apologies designed to prevent a case from 
ever getting to a jury, or even to a lawyer.21   
The discovery that apology programs could be financially 
beneficial to the average insurer or hospital was serendipitous.  
Long before the Joint Commission guidelines changed, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs hospital at Lexington, Kentucky 
(“Lexington VAMC”) created their own apology program based on 
changes to the VA’s internal guidelines.22  In a subsequent study, 
data indicated that disclosing errors in specific ways may not 
result in an increase in the number of malpractice claims or in 
the amount paid per claim.23  Its authors did not take too 
seriously the idea that its principles would be welcomed by 
 
 20 Benjamin Zimmermann, When Medical Malpractice Occurs, Sorry Seems to be the 
Hardest Word, SUGARMAN L. BLOG (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sugarman.com/blog/2010/ 
10/when-medical-malpractice-occurs-sorry-seems-to-be-the-hardest-word/. 
 21 See infra Part II (describing apology programs instituted at hospitals).  Even 
though many American hospitals are nominally “non-profit,” their risk management 
departments are akin to for-profit insurance companies.  The job of hospital’s “bottom-line 
oriented” risk management team is “to protect the financial assets of the hospital from 
claims asserted through the tort system.” Stephan Landsman, The Risk of Risk 
Management, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2315, 2316 (2010).  A hospital’s risk managers are, by 
contractual requirement, in league with the malpractice insurers that represent its 
doctors.  Their mission is to “oversee the institution’s relationship with those providing 
insurance coverage to pay awards made against the hospital for medical malpractice.” Id. 
at 2317.  In fact, this cooperation is contractually required and, as a result, the “required 
cooperation has serious implications for the care provided to patients after they have 
suffered injury at the hands of the medical staff.  The chief goal shifts from providing 
treatment to ‘paying as little money in settlements as possible . . . .’” Id.  As a result, it 
makes no difference whether the information about apology programs comes from risk 
managers in a hospital or from the insurance company itself.  Both are focused on legal 
liability and money, not the actual provision of medical care. 
 22 See infra notes 28–33 and accompanying text (discussing the VA’s guidelines for 
disclosure of unanticipated medical outcomes). 
 23 See infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text (discussing the results of a study of 
Lexington VAMC disclosure program). 
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hospitals outside of the VA system.24  However, once the Joint 
Commission ruled, all hospitals subject to their authority had 
little choice but to consider it.   
Subsequent studies supported the idea that many patients 
were willing to accept a fraction of the amount of money they 
would get in a malpractice suit if the doctor simply apologized.25  
In response, risk managers began to get serious about examining 
apology programs much more closely and, once convinced of their 
pecuniary benefits, began telling the public that they were a 
moral imperative.26 
II.  REPRESENTATIVE MODELS FOR APOLOGY PROGRAMS 
This part of the Article explains the workings of 
representative apology programs in the United States.  It begins 
with a discussion of the Lexington VAMC’s early experience, 
which disclosed errors to patients and also took measures to 
expressly advise the patient to seek legal counsel for what has 
become both a medical and legal issue. 
The Lexington VAMC program is important because it is the 
precursor to the models of apology programs currently employed 
in the United States.  It is also perhaps the last widely publicized 
program in the United States that included in its published 
protocol the need to advise unrepresented patients to seek legal 
counsel before confronting them with an apology and a set of 
decisions that would have legal consequences for them. 
Once the Joint Commission mandated that facilities disclose 
acts of malpractice, insurers had no choice but to admit acts of 
malpractice.  The VA program, having already created a path, 
became a model for others, which made subsequent adaptations 
to further tilt the process of admitting an act of malpractice in 
their financial favor.  This sub-section then goes on to explore the 
workings of two of these modern programs, the COPIC 3Rs 
program and the University of Michigan Health Services 
(“UMHS”) model. 
 
 24 See Steven S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May 
Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963, 966 (1999), available at 
http://www.annals.org/content/131/12/963.full.pdf (“If there is a barrier to the adoption of 
a humanistic risk management policy by nongovernmental hospitals, it may be the 
involvement of many private malpractice insurers, each of which is interested in paying 
as little money as possible.  We believe that these insurers would have to be convinced of 
the economical benefits of such a policy before they would consider adopting it.”). 
 25 See infra Part III (discussing how apologies affect victims’ willingness to settle). 
 26 See infra Part III (discussing psychological effects of apology programs).  See also 
note 8 (quoting sources regarding ethical necessity of apology programs). 
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A. Lexington, Kentucky VA Hospital 
Prior to the Joint Commission’s disclosure mandate, only one 
study had evaluated the effectiveness of an American medical 
malpractice apology program.27  In 1995, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs rewrote its policy manual to mandate disclosure 
to patients who had suffered an unanticipated outcome.28  In the 
event of an unanticipated outcome, the rules required that the 
medical center inform the patient and/or the family, as 
appropriate, of the event, and assure them that medical 
measures have been implemented and that additional steps are 
being taken to minimize disability, death, inconvenience, or 
financial loss to the patient or family.29 
In response, the Lexington VAMC created a protocol so that 
when the hospital’s risk management committee found that a 
doctor had committed malpractice, they would invite the injured 
patient to the hospital.30  When doing so, they would tell the 
patient that he or she was welcome to bring an attorney.31  When 
the patient arrived, the physician would explain what happened, 
express regret, answer any questions and “make an offer of 
restitution, which can involve subsequent corrective medical or 
surgical treatment, [and] assistance with filing for [disability] or 
monetary compensation.”32  The hospital would negotiate with 
the patient and, in the event the patient had not retained a 
lawyer and needed claims assistance, the hospital would help get 
forms to file and once again advise the patient to seek 
independent counsel.33 
Researchers tracked the Lexington VAMC’s data to test the 
impact of its apology policy.34  They determined that during a 
seven-year period (1990–1996) of studying the Lexington VAMC’s 
apology program, the facility’s payments were “moderate” and 
“comparable to those of similar facilities.”35  Thus, when injured 
patients were invited to bring legal counsel to discuss the doctor’s 
error and potential financial resolutions, the study suggested 
 
 27 See Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry Work?  The Impact of Apology Laws on 
Medical Malpractice 3 (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 04-2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1744225. 
 28 Kraman & Hamm, supra note 24, at 964. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 967. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 964. 
 35 Id. at 964, 966. 
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that the injured patients’ claim received roughly the same 
amount of money as in a traditional deny/defend situation.36   
The program also provided other benefits, like diminishing 
the injured patient’s anger and allowing for a continuing positive 
relationship between doctor and patient.37  The study’s authors 
also noted that their approach provided dramatic pecuniary 
benefits by avoiding unnecessary litigation expenses.38  They 
estimated that it costs the government $250,000 to litigate a 
single malpractice case (for medical experts, travel, appeal, 
incidental expenses).  By contrast, their new apology procedures 
required only an attorney, a paralegal to assist, and a few other 
hospital employees.39 
The Lexington VAMC research suggests that patients who 
are malpractice victims and who are invited to bring an attorney 
to negotiate on their behalf fare equally as well economically as 
those that pursue more traditional litigation methods.  The 
added benefit is that the process happens more quickly, with 
lower litigation costs and a legitimately ethical exchange that is 
focused on the patient.  The Lexington VAMC study’s authors 
predicted that it would take much more proof of an economic 
benefit before nongovernmental facilities would participate.40  
The barrier they identified is the involvement of private 
malpractice insurers, “each of which,” as the authors put it, “is 
interested in paying as little money in settlement as possible.”41   
The Lexington VAMC representatives’ prediction that their 
policy would be met with skepticism proved true.  For example, 
after the Joint Commission’s disclosure requirement came into 
effect, ECRI, a non-profit think-tank, expressed skepticism that 
other facilities would voluntarily use an apology program: “There 
are many who believe the experience of a VA hospital cannot be 
replicated in the private sector because the VA, unlike the 
private sector, has federal tort protections.”42   
Reflecting the profit motivation of nongovernmental 
insurers, the Lexington VAMC program is the last one for which 
there has been published research that specifically recommended 
that patients seek counsel before filing a claim.  The newer 
generation of apology programs includes some protections that 
 
 36 See id. at 965–66. 
 37 Id. at 966. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 ECRI Inst., supra note 8, at 12. 
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appear patient-friendly on their face, but remain adversarial at 
their core.   
B. Two Examples of Current Apology Programs 
Since the finding that apology programs can be used as a money-
saving strategy, various insurance companies and hospitals have 
instituted them.  This section focuses on two examples that represent 
common practices in the medical field today: COPIC and UMHS.  While 
they operate separately, common concerns are ultimately raised by each 
model as they both include mechanisms that appear designed to pay 
injured patients as little money as possible.  Further, they both 
encourage collaborative interpersonal behavior, but treat the financial 
aspect of claims handling as adversarial. 
i.  COPIC 
One of the models that apology advocates most commonly 
cite is COPIC’s 3Rs program (“Recognize, Respond, Resolve”).43  
COPIC is the primary insurer for Colorado physicians and, under 
the 3Rs program, patients who suffer from an “unanticipated 
outcome” can be offered up to $100 a day (capped at $5000) for 
their absence from work and reimbursement for out-of-pocket 
medical expenses of up to $25,000.44  COPIC defines their 
program as a “no-fault” program, meaning that they consider 
patients eligible regardless of whether there is clear 
malpractice.45  Cases involving “never events,” which are acts of 
clear malpractice (e.g., amputating the wrong leg), do not qualify 
for the 3Rs program.46  Instead, the program leaves open the 
 
 43 Thomas H. Gallagher, David Studdert & Wendy Levinson, Disclosing Harmful 
Medical Errors to Patients, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2713, 2716 (2007) (“The best-known 
private-sector disclosure program is the ‘3Rs’ program at COPIC.”).  See also Medical 
Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. 25 (2006) [hereinafter Medical 
Liability] (statement of David Studdert, Associate Professor of Law and Public Health, 
Harvard University Sch. of Public Health) (offering a health court proposal with the first 
level of review “proceed[ing] along the lines developed by the insurer COPIC (the ‘3-R’s’ 
program)”). 
 44 Press Release, COPIC, Clarke Joins Colo. Health Found. Bd. (Jan. 7, 2011), 
available at http://www.callcopic.com/who-we-are/press-room/press-room-detail?id=16; 
3Rs Program, COPIC (last visited May 18, 2011), http://www.callcopic.com/home/what-
we-offer/coverages/medical-professional-liability-insurance-co/physicians-medical-
practices/special-programs/3rs-program/. 
 45 Even champions of apology programs question the viability of a no-fault program 
like COPIC’s.  For example, the UMHS program’s architect and leader, Attorney Richard 
Boothman, testified before Congress that: “Alternatives loosely characterized as ‘no fault’ 
systems will not work.  The medical and insurance communities will not be fairly served 
by creating an entitlement not based on the reasonableness of care.” Medical Liability, 
supra note 43 (statement of Richard C. Boothman, Chief Risk Officer, UMHS). 
 46 See Richard E. Quinn & Mary C. Eichler, The 3Rs Program: The Colorado 
Experience, 51 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 709, 710 (2008) (recounting COPIC 
history and the exclusion of NQF’s “never events”). 
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ability for COPIC to quickly resolve murkier cases that may or 
may not have been the result of malpractice. 
The rules of program eligibility indicate that the program 
seems intended to avoid reporting insured doctors’ malpractice to 
regulatory authorities.  For example, under the 3Rs program, 
there can be no payments made for non-economic damages.47  
Another rule specifically prevents a patient from involving an 
attorney, and yet another rule disqualifies any patient who asks 
for money in writing.48  Any of these events would require 
reporting to the National Practitioners Data Bank.49  Thus, by 
precluding anyone from participation who would otherwise seek 
a lawyer or write a demand letter, COPIC can skirt reporting 
malpractice. 
The advocates for 3Rs might defend their program by 
claiming that if patients participate in the COPIC program, they 
may still theoretically pursue a malpractice claim because 
COPIC does not require patients to sign a release.50  However, 
the data indicates that not forcing a release is nearly irrelevant 
because COPIC’s research has shown that even without a 
release, fewer than twenty-four out of every twenty-five 
participants do not pursue a claim after going through their 
program.51  Even more troubling, the decision not to require a 
release from patients appears motivated by selfish reasons, as 
requiring a release would force COPIC to report the settlement to 
state and federal regulators, which they are able to avoid by 
calling it a “no-fault” program.52 
 
 47 Id.  Payment for non-economic damages may also force COPIC to admit the 
incident was a result of negligence, thus preventing the carrying-on of the fiction that 
they make payments regardless of whether negligence was involved. 
 48 See A Success Story, 1 COPIC’S 3RS PROGRAM (COPIC Ins. Co., Denver, Colo.), 
Mar. 2004 (listing exclusions from participation to include patients who have sent a 
“[d]emand letter” and stating that “payments are not reported to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank because they are not made in response to a written demand for 
monetary compensation”).  See also Carol Anne Tarrant, Dir., Facility Patient Safety and 
Risk Mgmt., COPIC’s 3Rs Program: Recognize, Respond to and Resolve Patient Injury, 
COPIC 18 (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.capsac.org/documents/Tarrant.CA.pdf (stating that 
among the incentives for doctors to participate in 3Rs is no reporting to NPDB (National 
Practitioners Data Bank) or CBME (Colorado Board of Medical Examiners)). 
 49 See Tarrant, supra note 48, at 18. 
 50 Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 710. 
 51 Case Studies: Focus on Disclosure, 3RS PROGRAM (COPIC Tr., Denver, Colo.), May 
2011, at 1, available at www.callcopic.com/resources/custom/PDF/3rs-newsletter/3rs-may-
2011.pdf (“Our continuing experience is that only 3.4 percent of 3Rs cases with 
reimbursements to patients subsequently result in malpractice claims or lawsuits.  Also, 
only 0.5 percent of such reimbursed 3Rs cases receive additional payments via 
malpractice claims or lawsuits.”). 
 52 Bruce D. Gehle, A Quick Check on the Impact of Apology Laws on Claims and 
Costs of Medical Malpractice, 11 HEALTHCARE LIABILITY & LITIG., May 2009, at 1, 2. 
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The idea that 3Rs is only for “minor” cases is also 
misleading.  They purport to be a “limited program designed to 
handle outcomes that are unlikely to involve serious negligence 
or injury”; the facts suggest that this claim is misleading.53  
While the 3Rs program does exclude death claims and “never 
events,” the evidence suggests that COPIC still uses the 3Rs 
program on cases involving very serious claims.54  In one account, 
which COPIC fictionalized, but was of the magnitude “often dealt 
with in COPIC’s 3Rs Program,” a 41-year-old patient underwent 
a colonoscopy and suffered a perforation to his colon as a result.55  
After the colonoscopy, the patient had severe abdominal pain due 
to “free air” (indicating the doctor punctured the patient’s colon 
during the colonoscopy).56  As a result, the surgical team then 
had to perform additional surgery to repair the hole in the man’s 
colon.57  This resulted in the patient being hospitalized for four 
additional days and missing “approximately six weeks of work.”58  
Despite their rhetoric, additional surgery, four days as an 
inpatient, and six weeks of missed work cannot reasonably be 
considered “not serious.” 
Despite the ethical problems it poses, the 3Rs program has 
been effective in dissuading patients from seeking the damages 
they would be entitled to under more traditional litigation 
channels.  For example, in 2003, the payments to patients under 
the 3Rs Program averaged $1820, as opposed to an average cost 
of more than $250,000 for traditionally-handled claims handled 
by the same insurer.59 
Beyond under-compensating malpractice victims, the 
broader impact of the 3Rs program has not been studied.  
Specifically, the rules under which the program operates—from 
not allowing attorney involvement to refusing to allow a patient 
who has written a letter from participating—seem designed to 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 See, e.g., Success Story, 3 COPIC’S 3RS PROGRAM (COPIC Ins. Co., Denver, Colo.), 
June 2006, available at http://www.callcopic.com/resources/custom/PDF/3rs-newsletter/ 
vol-3-issue-1-jun-2006.pdf (recounting a potentially grave injury addressed by the 3Rs 
program). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Will Apologies to Patients Drive Malpractice Lawyers Out of Business?, MED 
LEGAL NEWS (Med League Support Servs., N.J.), June 2006, at 2, available at  
http://www.medleague.com/Articles/Newsletters/newsletter26.pdf.  This approach has 
apparently been similarly effective in dissuading patients from seeking damages in other 
years.  For example, a 2005 article quotes a COPIC representative who states that “the 
average payment in 3Rs cases is $5586, while the average outside the program is about 
$284,000.” Deroy Murdock, “Sorry” Works, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 29, 2005, 8:03 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/215270/sorry-works/deroy-murdock. 
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discourage responsible reporting.  In turn, this weakens 
practitioner accountability and potentially harms patients who 
subsequently are treated by doctors that have committed 
malpractice but have not been investigated by the appropriate 
agencies as a result. 
ii.  UMHS 
The most commonly referenced apology program today is the 
University of Michigan Healthcare Services’ model.  UMHS 
purports to provide quick compensation for viable claims, defend 
claims they view as non-meritorious and “[r]educe patient 
injuries . . . by learning from patients’ experiences.”60  The 
architect of the UMHS program is Attorney Richard Boothman, 
who spent two decades as a medical malpractice defense lawyer 
before assuming his risk management post at UMHS.61  Attorney 
Boothman has become one of the most prominent proponents of 
apology programs in the United States.62 
UMHS’s philosophy is consistent with the concept of “cooling 
the mark out.”63  The underlying basis for the program is their 
belief that people pursue malpractice claims because they seek 
an explanation for their injury and have a desire to hold the 
responsible person accountable.64  To respond to that, UMHS 
created a system “more directly aimed at what drives a patient to 
call a lawyer [which] would better address the root cause of the 
problem.”65  Unlike COPIC, UMHS does allow patients to seek 
legal advice, although the organization does not do so routinely.66  
UMHS is a self-insured facility, which they state allows for 
“consistency and alignment of ethical and financial motivation[s] 
between the hospital, care provider, and insurer” which they 
consider an “important advantage.”67  However, their program 
does not have any built-in protection for patients against the 
conflict of interest this creates.  Instead, one must take it on faith 
that UMHS’s risk management department is capable of acting 
against the facility’s own financial interests and fully and fairly 
compensating injured patients.   
 
 60 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 139. 
 61 Biography, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS. (last visited Sept. 25, 2011), 
http://surgery.med.umich.edu/portal/research/faculty/boothman.shtml. 
 62 Biography, supra note 61. 
 63 See infra Part III(A) (explaining the concept of “cooling the mark out” and how 
UMHS’s model squares with it). 
 64 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 134. 
 65 Id. 
 66 E-mail from Richard C. Boothman, Chief Risk Officer, UMHS, to author (Aug. 10, 
2011, 14:16 EDT) (on file with author) (“We have overtly advised patients to have 
lawyers . . . but we do not routinely advise them to get a lawyer.”). 
 67 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 137. 
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UMHS does not publish their strategy for approaching the 
negotiations with the patients to whom they apologize.  However, 
a vignette UMHS uses to explain the mechanisms of their 
program suggests that an adversarial mindset underlies the 
program.68  In its literature, UMHS tells the story of JW, a 
thirty-six year-old mother of two.69  In 2003, she presented to her 
primary care physician’s office that she had found a lump in her 
breast.70  No follow-up was ordered by the doctor.71  Two years 
later, JW was diagnosed with breast cancer.72  It was treated 
with a complete mastectomy and radiation therapy.73  Her 
primary care doctor, one year later, “described her as disabled 
due to chronic fatigue syndrome, depressed, suffering chronic 
shoulder pain, and plagued by anxiety,” because of a perceived 
increased likelihood of recurrence of cancer.74 
The UMHS internal investigation committee found that the 
care JW received was sub-par for many reasons.75  Three of its 
reviewers said that the decisions her primary care doctor made 
were below the standard of care.76  Some reviewers believed there 
were ways to defend the case (including blaming JW for not 
returning for care more aggressively), but admitted “they would 
have handled it differently and [they] expected more of their 
colleagues under the same or similar circumstances.”77 
By its own estimate, UMHS believed that the case had a 
value of somewhere between $3.1 and $3.7 million if JW won.78  
Factoring in the chance of a plaintiff’s verdict at trial, which 
UMHS believed was likely, they determined that the case should 
settle for somewhere between $2,635,000 and $3,145,000.79 
UMHS met with JW, along with her husband and their 
attorney.80  UMHS brought one of its risk management 
 
 68 Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety at UMHS, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS. (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.med.umich.edu/news/newsroom/mm.htm#summary 
(“Our approach can be summarized as: ‘Apologize and learn when we’re wrong, explain 
and vigorously defend when we’re right, and view court as a last resort.’”). 
 69 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 151. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 152, 157. 
 75 Id. at 152 (“All reviewers agreed the covering doctor’s care . . . was below 
expectations for UMHS faculty.  Three reviewers said that the decision not to follow up on 
JW’s concerns with mammography and referral to a surgeon was a violation of the 
standard of care.”). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 155. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 157.  That JW was allowed to have an attorney participate is a positive 
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consultants (most of whom are trained mediators).81  At the 
outset of the meeting, UMHS apologized to JW.82  JW’s emotions 
warmed because of UMHS’s collaborative demeanor.83  JW asked 
if UMHS would settle the case for $2 million, a figure 
considerably less than UMHS’s projected settlement value.84  In 
response, UMHS accused JW of being “unreasonable” and 
inflating the value of her claim.85  JW reduced her settlement 
demand to $1.2 million, less than half of UMHS’s original 
estimate, but UMHS again refused.86  Eventually, UMHS’s 
tactics prevailed, with JW electing to accept UMHS’s $400,000 
settlement offer.87 
As a result, the apology program made it so that a case that 
UMHS initially believed had a value of between $2.6 and $3.1 
million, settled for only $400,000.88  This amount would cover the 
cost of JW’s children’s college expenses, about which JW 
expressed concern when she learned that her doctor’s malpractice 
might result in her death.89  By UMHS’s initial estimate, the 
$400,000 for which JW settled did not cover her future medical 
costs, lost wages/benefits caused by their doctor’s negligence, nor 
any non-economic damages for the emotional impact for JW’s 
ordeal.90   
 
advance beyond COPIC’s 3Rs program, which would disqualify the patient if she hired 
counsel. See Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 710 (“If there was any attorney 
involvement, 3Rs benefits and involvement would cease.”).  The point of including this 
vignette is to demonstrate that UMHS’s procedures remain fundamentally adversarial, 
not to accuse UMHS of refusing to allow JW to seek representation.  Although the legal 
advice JW’s attorney provided seems sub-par (as discussed below, JW ultimately settled 
the case for pennies on the dollar prior to discovery), that is hardly UMHS’s fault. 
 81 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 157. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 158 (“After that night (of the meeting), I left there like I was on a 
mountaintop.  I felt like I had finally been heard, they listened.”). 
 84 Id. at 156. 
 85 Id. (“The plaintiff’s lawyer’s economic assessment was critically reviewed by an 
economist expert retained by UMHS and a contra-assessment was prepared, pointing out 
unreasonable assumptions and inflated calculations.”).  
 86 Id. at 157. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 155, 157. 
 89 Id. at 156, 157. 
 90 Id. at 155.  UMHS also claimed that JW, because of UMHS’s disclosure and 
approach to resolution, did not suffer pain and suffering that she would have if they had 
used the traditional “deny and defend” approach to her claim.  Although emotional stress 
resulting from the litigation process is not compensable in the civil justice system, 
UMHS’s claim that avoiding the stress of litigation benefited JW is certainly a good thing, 
although it would have no impact on the value of her case at trial. See, e.g., Ortega v. 
Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 800 (1998) (holding that damages 
may not be awarded for “litigation stress”). 
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This outcome was a good result in the sense that JW was 
pleased with it.91  However, the vignette leaves open several 
questions that should be vitally important to consider: 
 In whose interest was UMHS acting when it paid JW 
$400,000 in a settlement it viewed as being worth 
more than seven times that amount? 
 If JW is unable to pay her future medical costs (which 
UMHS estimated to be $250,000–$400,000) as a 
result of accepting this settlement, who will do so? 
 How will JW and her family be compensated for the 
$2,350,000–$2,750,000 in lost wages and benefits that 
UMHS estimated she suffered as a result of its 
doctor’s negligence if she becomes unable to work? 
Because UMHS selectively releases data on their program, it 
is unclear whether JW’s experience in the apology program was 
representative.  Even the statistics that UMHS publishes makes 
it difficult to see what happens to individual claims with merit.  
For example, a recent article written by Attorney Boothman and 
others reported some aspects of the financial effects of UMHS’s 
apology program.92  They reported that after UMHS implemented 
the apology program, the overall number of claims dropped, as 
did the amount of money spent both defending claims and 
compensating patients.93  The study did not report, however, 
statistics explaining whether individual patients that made 
claims were compensated less after the program was 
implemented.  In other words, it has not been made public 
whether patients with valid claims for malpractice are giving up 
some compensation to which they are entitled in exchange for the 
warm discussions UMHS provides.  If the small glimpse provided 
by JW’s case is a representative of what UMHS does, then the 
organization derives significant financial benefits by paying less 
money to patients injured by medical errors.94 
 
 91 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 158 (“I was perfectly satisfied after that night.  
What that apology meant to me was that they had listened finally and I had been 
heard.”).  UMHS also seems to indicate that the act of taking part in the apology process 
had a positive medical outcome on JW and drove her damages down. Id. at 156–58.  The 
basis for this is that JW’s position during negotiation was that her malpractice-related 
injuries were disabling. Id. at 152.  However, after the negotiations were completed, she 
returned to work. Id. at 158.  The idea that this negotiation single-handedly transformed 
JW from being totally and permanently disabled to someone who could immediately 
resume her prior life is simply unsupported by any evidence other than UMHS’s say-so. 
 92 Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation 
of a Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 213 (2010). 
 93 Id. at 215, 217–19. 
 94 See Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 151–58. 
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When Attorney Boothman testified before the United States 
Senate in 2006, he cited the dramatic successes of the UMHS 
program in lowering costs and reducing the time of claim-
completion.95  He noted that physicians need to ask, “Why would 
my patient feel the need for an advocate?”96  Although this 
question was undoubtedly meant to be rhetorical, it requires an 
actual answer: Patients need an advocate because programs like 
UMHS have attorneys whose primary obligation is to protect the 
assets of their organization.  This dynamic results in what is, in 
actuality, an adversarial environment that simply uses 
collaborative language.  Without legal advice of their own, 
patients who take part in apology programs must trust that risk 
managers would violate their obligation to their own employer (of 
keeping overall costs low), in order to give them an appropriate 
settlement.  There is simply no evidence that this has, or will, 
occur and no program has released any data to that effect. 
Yet, it should not be lost that the UMHS model does most of 
the things a good disclosure program should do (including many 
things COPIC would refuse to allow): it advises the patient of 
what happened, allows the patient to seek legal counsel 
(although it does not necessarily advise it), increases the speed of 
settlement negotiations to keep costs low, and so on.97  
Ultimately, though, stories like that of JW also expose its 
underlying adversarial nature.   
III.  CONVINCING PATIENTS THAT LESS MONEY IS BETTER 
Because program administrators will not admit to it, it 
cannot be said with absolute certainty that medical apology 
programs are specifically designed to exploit the research on 
influencing patients to accept less compensation for valid injuries 
caused by malpractice.  However, what can be said with accuracy 
is that what apology programs are willing to publish about their 
approach makes their behavior at least appear to be consistent 
with the research on how to influence people to control an 
outcome in a negotiation. 
A. Cooling the Mark Out 
In 1952, Erving Goffman explained that when con men “cool 
the mark out,” as a method of preventing their dissatisfied victim 
from complaining to the authorities, they use a variety of 
 
 95 Medical Justice, supra note 43, at 4. 
 96 Id. at 7. 
 97 See generally Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 137–50. 
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methods.98  In its most basic form, cooling the mark out requires 
that “one of the operators stays with the mark and makes an 
effort to keep the anger of the mark within manageable and 
sensible proportions . . . and exercises upon the mark the art of 
consolation.”99  In other words, the primary function of the 
“cooler”—the person tasked with consoling the mark—is “to 
define the situation for the mark in a way that makes it easy for 
him to accept the inevitable” and quietly move on without 
causing unwanted negative attention for the con men.100   
Goffman envisioned cooling the mark out as being applied in 
all sorts of social relationships.101  Even legitimate organizations, 
according to Goffman, have a need to cool out customers.102  In 
the medical industry, Goffman noted that doctors frequently 
serve as coolers to break bad news to patients as a way to control 
their response.103  The doctor is often the one to do this because it 
is advisable to “give the task to someone whose status relative to 
the mark will serve to ease the situation in some way.”104  The 
doctor-patient relationship involves just this sort of disparate 
social status.  As a result, it should come as no surprise that 
apology programs frequently use a doctor to have a discussion 
with the patient.105 
Goffman said that the effectiveness of cooling the mark out 
rests in creating a system that allows the mark, “under suitable 
guidance, to give full vent to his initial shock.”106  In other words, 
 
 98 See Goffman, supra note 5, at 452. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 456.  Others have applied the concept of cooling the mark out to different 
contexts.  For example, some see the role of junior/community college administrators to be 
coolers for students who are not “college material.” Burton R. Clark, The “Cooling-Out” 
Function in Higher Education, 65 AM. J. SOC. 569, 569 (1960).  Others have studied the 
process of women who cool out undesirable male suitors at singles bars. See, e.g., David A. 
Snow et al., “Cooling Out” Men in Singles Bars and Nightclubs: Observations on the 
Interpersonal Survival Strategies of Women in Public Places, 19 J. CONTEMP. 
ETHNOGRAPHY 423, 423 (1991).  The process of cooling out has been studied in legal 
contexts, including the role of criminal defense attorneys who must prepare their clients 
to accept a jail sentence. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: 
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15, 27 (1967).  Cooling out 
has even subtlety been employed in popular entertainment.  In the hit 1989 film, Road 
House, Dalton (played by Patrick Swayze) is a professional “cooler” who uses his expertise 
in psychology and New York University philosophy degree to combat a group of violent 
nightclub patrons who are disrupting a small town bar, the “Double Deuce,” and the 
surrounding community. ROAD HOUSE (United Artists 1989). 
 102 Goffman, supra note 5, at 455. 
 103 Id. at 457. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See, e.g., Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 142 (describing physician-delivered 
disclosure and apology at UMHS); Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 713 (describing the 
value of direct physician/patient disclosure and apology at COPIC). 
 106 Goffman, supra note 5, at 458. 
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the mark is encouraged to articulate their righteous anger and 
move beyond the situation at hand.  This part of the process is 
specifically spelled out in various apology protocols.  For 
example, in the SorryWorks!107 model, diffusion of answer is 
defined as the first thing that a doctor should understand about 
effective apologies: “The key is anger . . . .disclosure [sic] and 
apology keep a lid on anger, whereas traditional deny and defend 
risk management strategies increase anger felt by patients & 
families, and increase the likelihood of costly litigation.”108  When 
they provide this advice, SorryWorks! recognizes that its function 
is not to increase a patient’s knowledge or the doctor-patient 
relationship.  Instead, their reason is financial: “An enormous & 
growing body of data is showing that disclosure coupled with 
apology (when appropriate) actually reduces lawsuits, litigation 
expenses, and settlements/judgments.”109  In other words, 
allowing the patient to vent is a money-saver for hospitals and 
insurers at patients’ expense. 
One specific technique Goffman notes is that the cooler can 
effectuate the process by assigning a new role to the mark.110  
Medical apology programs do this as well, at times asking 
patients who have been cooled out to tell their story and 
encourage others to do the same.  For example, JW, the cancer 
survivor about whom UMHS wrote, was enlisted to film a video 
extolling UMHS’s apology program and her satisfaction with it.111 
Coolers themselves sometimes need to be convinced to follow 
their role because of internal conflict about what they are doing 
to the mark.  To be able to participate in cooling out, Goffman 
found that the cooler “protects himself from feelings of guilt by 
arguing that the customer is not really in need of the service he 
expected to receive . . . and complaints are a sign of bile, not a 
sign of injury.”112  The apology literature is replete with 
rationalizations that the pursuit of damages for malpractice is 
often based upon an injured patient’s anger.113  Likewise, the 
 
 107 SorryWorks! is an “advocacy organization for disclosure, apology (when 
appropriate), and upfront compensation (when necessary) after adverse medical events.” 
About Us, SORRYWORKS! (last visited Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.sorryworks.net/ 
about.phtml. 
 108 5 Things Every Doctor Should Know About Disclosure!, SORRYWORKS! (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2011), http://sorryworks.net/fivethings.phtml [hereinafter 5 Things]. 
 109 5 Things, supra note 108. 
 110 Goffman, supra note 5, at 456–57. 
 111 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 157. 
 112 Goffman, supra note 5, at 455. 
 113 See, e.g., Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 133 (explaining patients file suit when 
they feel lied to or mislead); Kraman & Hamm, supra note 24, at 963 (illustrating reasons 
patients file suit, including breakdowns in the doctor/patient relationship due to 
physicians’ failure to disclose errors). 
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literature on apologies is filled with rhetoric about patients and 
lawyers injured by malpractice seeking “big bucks,” presumably 
for injuries that do not justify it.114  This language used by 
apology programs supports Goffman’s theory that those involved 
from the medical perspective seek justifications that allow them 
to inoculate themselves from the guilt associated with the 
process.   
B. The Psychology of Apology 
Not only does Goffman’s explanation of cooling the mark out 
appear consistent with the strategy of medical apology programs, 
psychologists have also explained how apologies affect 
individuals’ interpretations of an incident that gave rise to their 
legal claim, as well as their decision to seek legal advice for it.115  
In summary, the findings show that not only is a person less 
likely to pursue litigation following a doctor’s apology, but even if 
a patient does still pursue money damages, the patient is likely 
to adopt a more pliant negotiating position.116  This generalized 
research squares with the research performed by apology 
programs themselves.  For example, UMHS’s research found that 
of the patients that participate, “71% admitted that they 
accepted less in settlement than they would have had they 
litigated the case.”117 
A leading scholar on the role of apology in the law, Professor 
Jennifer Robbennolt of the University of Illinois, has written a 
series of works exploring the role of apologies in litigation.118  
 
 114 See, e.g., Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 709–10 (“Only one third of dollars 
actually reach injured parties.  At the same time, it seemed truly substandard care was 
not reliably identified by the legal system.  Furthermore, this system was inherently 
adversarial almost always destroying the physician/patient relationship.”). 
 115 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Civil Justice, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL 
JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 195, 197 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. 
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Robbenolt, Civil Justice].  “A growing body of studies suggests 
that apologies do influence claimant decision making in a number of ways, including 
decisions to consult attorneys for advice, decisions about whether or not to file suit, 
judgments about negotiating positions, and ultimate decisions about settlement.” Id. at 
209. 
 116 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL L. 
STUD. 333, 333 (2006) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Settlement Levers]. 
 117 J. Sybil Biermann & Richard Boothman, There Is Another Approach to Medical 
Malpractice Disputes, 4 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 148, 148 (2006). 
 118 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical 
Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 460 (2003) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Legal 
Settlement] (examining empirical evidence of the effect of apology on perception and 
decision-making); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLINICAL 
ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 376, 376 (2009) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Apologies and 
Med. Error]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of 
Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (2005) 
[hereinafter Robbennolt, What We Know].  
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While apology programs do not publish the psychological 
mechanisms they employ when dealing with patients, Professor 
Robbennolt’s findings about what effectively persuades a person 
square very well with what the literature indicates happens in 
apology programs.119 
First, apologies appear to work when they lessen the degree 
of anger patients feel toward their physicians.120  In fact, the 
“types of injurious actions that are often at issue in civil 
litigation—violation of the victim’s autonomy—have been 
specifically linked to anger responses.”121  The way a physician 
apologizes influences the patient’s attitude toward the physician 
and the prospects of settlement.122  In fact, an inadequate or 
poorly delivered apology may cause a person to file suit.123  This 
is known by those that create apology protocols, with some 
programs reminding doctors that although the Joint Disclosure 
rules do not require an apology, failing to do so will likely make 
the situation worse because the communication will lack “human 
touch.”124  Apology advocates also know the medical institution’s 
relationship with the patient is strained after they harm 
patients, and counsel physicians to “bring the patient and family 
closer and embrace them” by making the patient “their best 
friend.”125  This appears to match the finding that there is a 
correlation between anger and litigation, and plays out in 
apology programs when programs recommend specific strategies 
for diffusing that anger:  
Any effective, meaningful apology has four basic elements: (1) 
Empathy or “sorry”; (2) Admission of fault . . . [;] (3) Explanation of 
what happened and how it will be prevented from happening again; 
(4) As necessary, an offer of compensation or some sort of fix to the 
problem that has been created.  These elements, in the right cases, 
eliminate anger felt by the aggrieved party . . . .  It is important to 
explain what happened and how it will be prevented from happening 
again. . . .  Patients want to know what happened.126 
 
 119 See, e.g., Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, supra note 118, at 487. 
 120 Robbennolt, Civil Justice, supra note 115, at 202; Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, 
supra note 118, at 488.  This, of course, is also consistent with the observation Goffman 
made about the role of a cooler in allowing a mark to vent. Goffman, supra note 4, at 457 
(“Another standard method of cooling the mark out—one which is frequently employed in 
conjunction with other methods—is to allow the mark to explode, to break down, to cause 
a scene, to give full vent to his reactions and feelings, to ‘blow his top.’  If this release of 
emotions does not find a target, then it at least serves a cathartic function.”). 
 121 Robbennolt, Civil Justice, supra note 115, at 202. 
 122 Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 116, at 363. 
 123 Robbennolt, What We Know, supra note 118, at 1024. 
 124 CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2. 
 125 DOUG WOJCIESZAK ET AL., SORRY WORKS! DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND 
RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 60–61 (2d ed. 2010). 
 126 Id. at 62–63. 
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In terms of timing, patients are more impacted by apologies 
delivered soon after the negligence occurred, as opposed to later 
apologies, which are more easily recognizable as ploys to avoid 
litigation.127  To avoid this, apology advocates tell physicians to 
initiate an apology as soon as possible.128 
In terms of content of the apology, psychologists have found 
that patients are most influenced when physicians offer “full” 
apologies under which they take total responsibility for causing 
the harm.129  A “partial” apology—when the physician simply 
expresses sympathy—has less of an effect on a patient’s attitude, 
but still influences patients to settle for less than if the physician 
offered no apology at all.130  Apology advocates have recognized 
that even these partial measures have benefits: when physicians 
are unwilling to take responsibility for adverse outcomes (or 
when, for example, that expression of responsibility might not be 
covered under the jurisdiction’s apology shield law), apology 
advocates still encourage them to make this partial apology: 
“Convey compassion and empathy for [the] patient’s and family’s 
suffering . . . [Words like] ‘I’m sorry that you. . .’ [or] ‘I am sorry 
for your,’” etc., can assist in re-building trust between the doctor 
and patient. 
Psychologists have also determined several factors that 
affect patients’ subconscious attitudes towards their 
physicians.131  For example, the way a physician dresses has a 
demonstrable effect upon patients’ perceptions, establishing 
authority and credibility.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that those 
in the medical field are well aware of this.  One commentator 
reported that a doctor told her: 
[L]uckily for us, most patients will accept an apology, but it matters a 
lot how you give it.  If you apologize in the hospital or in your office, 
you’ve got it made.  It’s really important to have the white coat on and 
a stethoscope around your neck, though.  If you go in there dressed as 
any Joe, it won’t work.132 
Apology experts encourage physicians to carefully control the 
conditions of the disclosure session.  Each possible variable, 
including the apologizer’s manner of dress133 and the location of 
 
 127 MICHAEL S. WOODS, HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN MEDICINE 45 
(2004) (“Delays in communication make patients and families suspicious.”). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 116, at 368. 
 130 Id. 
 131 John E. Ware & Mary K. Snyder, Dimensions of Patient Attitudes Regarding 
Doctors and Medical Care Services, 13 MED. CARE 669, 670 (1975). 
 132 Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent 
Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1079–80 (2004). 
 133 Shakaib U. Rehman et al., What to Wear Today?  Effect of Doctor’s Attire on the 
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the session134 have been studied by the medical industry and 
have the ability to influence the patient’s reaction to the benefit 
of the hospital or insurer.   
On its own, there is nothing wrong with physicians using 
psychology to maintain their relationships with patients after 
adverse effects—in some respects, these strategies are simply 
good customer service.  The problem, however, is when these 
strategies are used to influence legal decisions as opposed to 
medical ones.135 
IV.  IF EVERYONE IS HAPPY, WHAT’S WRONG?136 
The literature on apology programs is replete with anecdotes 
conveying the happiness of patients who gladly agreed to resolve 
a case as a result of an apology, even if they did so for little or no 
compensation.137  The underlying argument seems to be that if a 
patient is happy, then it is a good result.  The literature, 
however, never makes clear what percentage of patients are 
ignorant about what they are giving up when they take a partial 
payment instead of full compensation.  The programs leave open 
the possibility of short-changing patients on economic damages, 
and (especially) non-economic damages, which apology programs 
seem fixated on washing away altogether.  The literature also 
never considers the long-term effect of this partial compensation 
on the patient and society as a whole.  This part addresses that 
issue. 
The tort system addresses the challenge of compensating 
victims for their damages—making them whole—by calculating 
values for each type of harm suffered.138  The value of many types 
of harm is simple to determine because there are market rates 
 
Trust and Confidence of Patients, 118 AM. J. MED. 1279, 1280 (2005).  Research indicates 
patients overwhelmingly want physicians to display that authority, and meeting that 
expectation builds trust. Id. at 1283. 
 134 See TRUOG ET AL., supra note 10, at 81 (encouraging physicians to disclose errors 
at the bedside or a quiet location where everyone can be comfortably seated). 
 135 See, e.g., Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 116, at 363 (discussing the 
effect of apologies on the settlement of potential medical malpractice legal claims). 
 136 I give particular thanks and recognition to my research assistant extraordinaire, 
Christopher J. Fiorentino, who took the lead in drafting this part of the Article. 
 137 See MASS. COAL. FOR THE PREVENTION OF MED. ERRORS, WHEN THINGS GO 
WRONG: RESPONDING TO ADVERSE EVENTS 28–29 (2006), available at 
http://www.macoalition.org/documents/respondingToAdverseEvents.pdf (recounting 
patient’s “positive” experience after she received an apology and “token” compensation 
after negligence in her cancer treatments); Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 715 
(reporting patient “expressed sincere appreciation” after COPIC reimbursed her $3898 for 
a damaged ureter that required an extra surgery and extended recovery). 
 138 1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01 (2011). 
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for the jury to reference.139  However, non-economic harms are 
more difficult because:  
There is no direct correspondence between money and harm to the 
body, feelings or reputation.  There is no market price for a scar or for 
loss of hearing since the damages are not measured by the amount for 
which one would be willing to suffer the harm.  The discretion of the 
judge or jury determines the amount of recovery, the only standard 
being such an amount as a reasonable person would estimate as fair 
compensation.140   
That pain and suffering can be difficult to calculate, 
however, is not an appropriate reason to downplay its 
significance.  As Professor Neil Komesar of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School has noted: 
The importance of these nonpecuniary losses can be seen by asking 
yourself whether you would be indifferent or even nearly indifferent 
between an uninjured state and a severely injured state, such as 
paraplegia, blindness, or severe brain damage, so long as your income 
and wealth remained constant.141 
For this reason, the courts have long recognized the 
importance of compensating plaintiffs for their suffering.142   
By contrast, apology programs only offer a small portion of 
the total range of damages.  COPIC only compensates victims for 
a maximum of $30,000 of out-of-pocket expenses, and does not 
compensate victims for their pain and suffering.143  It is 
unclear—because they have not released the data—as to how 
UMHS tabulates damages.  However, in JW’s case, the 
settlement value was tied to the projected cost of her children’s 
college education, as opposed to the value of the damages she 
sustained.144  Nothing was paid to her for non-economic 
damages.145 
Tort reformers have argued that non-economic damage 
awards are unfair because juries tend to unreasonably calculate 
them in favor of a plaintiff.146  Seizing upon this notion, the 
 
 139 Id. at § 1.02. 
 140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1979). 
 141 Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 58 (1990). 
 142 See, e.g., Random v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 15 N.Y. 415, 424 (1857) (awarding a 
negligently injured railroad passenger damages for “bodily pain and suffering, without 
reference to the time when endured”).   
 143 Quinn & Eichler, supra note 46, at 710. 
 144 Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 156. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the 
Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2004) (arguing that pain and suffering 
damages are inconsistent with the goals of tort law—to “return the injured person to his 
pre-injury position”—because the only damages that “can genuinely nullify some of the 
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insurance industry has waged a lengthy campaign to limit 
malpractice damages (and thus to limit their own exposure).147  
Their lobbyists have convinced over half of state legislatures to 
implement tort reforms and place arbitrary caps on how much 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits can recover, regardless of 
how badly the victim is injured.148  As a result, legislatures have 
somewhat skewed tort litigation in favor of the injurers rather 
than the injured.   
Nevertheless, unlike apology programs involving 
unrepresented injured patients, the traditional litigation system 
is administered by impartial judges, essentially requiring that 
each party be represented by legal counsel, and utilizing 
disinterested juries to calculate damages.  By contrast, in apology 
programs, part of the goal seems to be keeping plaintiffs away 
from the tort system altogether.  The result is that, when 
patients—particularly unrepresented patients—are 
compensated, there is no third party considering the itemized 
damages.  Instead, the calculation seems to be based on the 
smallest figure that will mollify the patient. 
By playing on psychology and the dynamic of an injured 
patients’ interaction with a physician coached by an insurance 
company, those that would otherwise be required to pay the 
 
pain are economic damages for medical expenses to cover pain management and 
rehabilitation, not noneconomic damages for pain and suffering”).  “The tacit assumption 
[made by opponents of noneconomic damages] is that pain and suffering damages are 
frivolous and too often granted for phantom or imaginary pain.” Michael L. Rustad, 
Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Meritorious 
Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 379–80 (2006). 
 147 See Michael Rustad, The Jurisprudence of Hope: Preserving Humanism in Tort 
Law, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1099, 1128 (1994) (noting that in 1994 insurance companies 
had lobbied for fifteen years to limit medical malpractice liability). 
 148 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice 
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 396 (2005) (noting that a majority of states have 
imposed some kind of limitation on the amount of damages available to a plaintiff in a 
medical malpractice claim).  For example, in Massachusetts, damages for noneconomic 
losses are limited to $500,000 unless there are “special circumstances” that justify raising 
the award above the cap. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West 2000).  In 
California, noneconomic losses are capped at $250,000 regardless of extenuating 
circumstances. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).  In Colorado, home of COPIC 
insurance, all damages in medical malpractice cases are limited to $1,000,000 (of which 
only $250,000 may be for noneconomic damages) unless the court grants special leave. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302(1)(b) (West 2005).  The theoretical purpose of capping 
damages is to lower physicians’ insurance premiums, but the data does not support that 
conclusion. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on 
the Delivery of Health Care, 8 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 13 (2005), available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/achandr/FHPR_EffectofMalpracticeHealthCareDelivery_2
005.pdf.  Further, early advocates of caps contended they had no negative effect on 
patient care, but these caps may actually make medical care more dangerous. See Janet 
Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes 36 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12478, 2006) (finding damage caps 
increase complications of childbirth). 
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traditional damages have discovered value in disclosure and 
apology.   
While protecting profits is an understandable goal for an 
insurance company, it comes at a cost: every extra dollar of profit 
realized by the insurer resulting from a medical apology is a 
dollar taken from an injured patient.  On its own, convincing an 
individual not to sue is no different than any other “bad” 
settlement.  What makes this different is the appearance of a 
system of methods designed to dissuade patients from actually 
considering their rights before settling for short money.  It also 
creates a secondary problem; that plaintiffs who accept 
settlements for less money than their claim is worth may become 
a drain on society.  With no damages to cover future lost wages or 
future medical expenses, the taxpayers may be left footing the 
bill for the negligence of others. 
By ignoring the measures of damages applied by American 
courts and steering patients from a neutral venue to redress 
innocent victims’ injuries, these programs stack the deck in favor 
of the insurance companies who administer them.  The result is 
that others bear the long-term costs of going uncompensated for 
their physicians’ mistakes. 
V.  THE CURE:  “MALPRACTICE MIRANDA” AND OTHER FIXES 
Apology programs, if run properly, are worth saving.  This is 
because, despite all of the potential for abuse, they still have 
positive attributes: insurers and injured patients alike benefit 
from lower litigation costs (both with respect to attorneys’ fees on 
both sides, as well as reducing the costs of discovery, experts, and 
other expenses); they promote faster resolutions; they allow for 
an ongoing doctor-patient relationship (assuming the patient is 
comfortable with it); and, most importantly, they aid the 
patient’s subjective sense of satisfaction with the resolution and 
outlook for future treatment.  There is no reason that these goals 
could not still be met while reforming what requires repair.  This 
part of the Article suggests necessary changes to do so. 
A. Assuring Injured Patients Understand Their Rights 
The primary problem with current apology programs is that 
injured patients are put in a position in which they might easily 
confuse the willingness of a provider to communicate with the 
willingness of a provider to compensate them fully.  Therefore, 
the first and most important step is to require apology programs 
to allow their patients a real opportunity to educate themselves 
on their rights before being influenced to settle. 
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To prevent a patient’s potential confusion, apology programs 
should be required to advise patients in any case that has more 
than a nominal value that they will not resolve the matter with 
the patient unless and until the patient is educated on his or her 
legal rights.149  This should involve advising patients to speak to 
an attorney.  Patients who, after being so advised, choose not to 
seek counsel should be given a reasonable period of time 
thereafter to make a sober decision.  This “Malpractice Miranda” 
would help patients understand their rights and give them an 
opportunity to make a sober, intelligent decision about their 
needs as a result of the malpractice.   
Providing information about the possible need to seek an 
attorney is a rarity among apology programs, with ninety-six 
percent not doing so.150  Involving attorneys is recommended by 
the SorryWorks! organization: “Patients and families should 
never feel like the hospital/insurer is trying to pull a fast one on 
them, and by encouraging involvement of [personal injury] 
attorneys you remove those fears and make your disclosure 
program credible.”151  Yet, neither COPIC (which expressly 
forbids it) nor UMHS (which allows attorney involvement, but 
does not expressly recommend it) accept the view that patients 
are entitled to know their legal rights before negotiation.  One 
possible reason for this discrepancy is that SorryWorks! is an 
advocacy group that has no financial stake in the resolution of 
claims.  By contrast, self-insured hospitals like UMHS and 
insurers like COPIC are obligated to pay the cost of a settlement 
and may believe that educating patients about legal decisions 
could result in more expenses for their organizations. 
Because apology programs influence legal decisions, the 
ethical rules that require a doctor to recommend to malpractice 
victims that they seek legal counsel should be parallel to that of a 
similarly situated attorney who suspects he or she has committed 
malpractice.  When a lawyer abuses a client’s trust in order to 
avoid a malpractice suit, the lawyer is violating his or her 
 
 149 Not every error that merits an apology, of course, should go down the legal path.  
Minor errors that could never realistically result in a claim being brought should be 
handled informally (e.g., an overly-rough phlebotomist causing bruising).  However, once 
risk management becomes involved, it would follow that because the hospital is 
evaluating the matter from a legal angle, the injured patient should be afforded the same 
opportunity.   
 150 See Lamb et al., supra note 16, at 77 (stating that only four percent of hospitals 
with disclosure programs provide information about lawyers). 
 151 September 13, 2006 Newsletter, SORRYWORKS! (last visited Sept. 10, 2011, 
11:23 PM), http://sorryworks.net/newsletter20060913.phtml. 
Do Not Delete 11/18/2011 4:38 PM 
334 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 15:2 
responsibility to the client.152  The American Bar Association’s 
ethical rules state: 
A lawyer shall not . . . settle a claim or potential claim for . . . liability 
with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is 
advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a 
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel 
in connection therewith.153 
The legal community has accepted that this is of vital 
importance.  As a result, lawyers failing to disclose this conflict of 
interest before settling a claim are subject to steep penalties, and 
may lose their licenses.154 
The reason given to lawyers for this ethical obligation is as 
applicable to the doctors that ask their injured patients to make 
a legally significant decision about settlement: “By seeking to 
settle his own liability, a lawyer places himself in direct conflict 
with a client.  Requiring lawyers to advise clients to consult 
independent counsel before settling a malpractice dispute helps 
ensure that clients are well informed before they give up 
important rights.”155 
Many of the programs outlining disclosure measures suggest 
language for doctors to use to show empathy, respect, and 
understanding of the gravity of the situation.  Under the concept 
of the “Malpractice Miranda,” this language could be 
supplemented with language about the legal aspects of the 
malpractice apology program.  The doctor could say: 
My goal is to make you better.  In addition to promising to do my best 
to fix your injuries, I want you to understand that because of this 
error, you have legal rights.  I tell you this because I do not just accept 
responsibility for what happened to you medically, but because I also 
accept the consequences of that.  Therefore, you have to know that I 
do not take it personally if you pursue your legal rights.  In fact, I buy 
insurance for just this reason and, although I am sad that it is needed, 
my goal is to make you whole again, including getting fair 
compensation.  I am not a lawyer, and just like you would not want a 
lawyer to give medical advice, a physician should not give legal 
advice—especially when there is potentially a conflict of interest.  
 
 152 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2011) (discussing conflicts of interest 
in client-lawyer relationships). 
 153 Id. 
 154 See, e.g., In re Carson, 991 P.2d 896, 903, 905 (Kan. 1999) (censuring publicly a 
lawyer who attempted to settle an unrepresented former client’s malpractice case);; In re 
Henderson, 819 So. 2d 296, 301–02 (La. 2002) (disbarring a lawyer for failing to disclose 
malpractice and seeking a release from his client without advising him to seek third-party 
legal advice); In re Tallon, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1982) (suspending a lawyer from 
practice for six months for failure to disclose advisability of independent counsel while 
negotiating a malpractice release). 
 155 ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT § 51:1112 (2011). 
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Therefore, before we agree to any amount of compensation, or any 
other way we agree is fair to make you whole, I want you to speak to a 
lawyer.  It is up to you if you choose to do so, but my advice is that you 
should do so.  I will not allow you to sign any release156 before you 
have spoken to a lawyer or you have had some time to think about it.  
This is because I feel badly about this situation and I want the best for 
you, even if it means that my insurance company has to pay you 
money for this accident. 
The industry’s advocates would likely argue that patients 
who participate in apology programs are satisfied with having 
done so, thus they are, by definition, successful.157  That misses 
the point: blissful ignorance is not something for which the 
medical community, or society as a whole, should strive.  To date, 
the medical-insurance industry’s research does not make clear if 
apology program participants are ever even aware of what it is 
that they are giving up when they settle their cases as part of an 
apology program.  If apology programs were willing to provide 
this education, it would set the stage for a fair result.  By 
contrast, if insurance companies feel obligated to try to pay the 
minimum possible amount of money to patients who have been 
the victims of malpractice, they should, at the least, not make the 
doctors who pay premiums complicit in doing so.  Doctors can, 
and should, be free to tell patients that legal advice is the best 
route to help them get the compensation they need to care for 
themselves and their loved ones as a result of an unfortunate 
medical event.   
B. Processing Claims Quickly and Fairly 
UMHS and the Lexington VAMC both identify the ability to 
resolve claims quickly as a benefit to apology programs.158  It 
would follow that prompt resolution would also potentially 
benefit patients, as long as they have an opportunity to fully 
consider their options before choosing whether to pursue 
litigation. 
To accomplish fast claims-processing, as well as fairness to 
allow patients to consider their options, one solution is to allow 
 
 156 Of course, some disclosure programs, like COPIC’s 3Rs program, do not require a 
release.  In that case, the doctor should tell the patient that they should consider 
pursuing a claim and that the disclosure program will not offer them any money until 
they do so. 
 157 See Boothman et al., supra note 10, at 158 (publicizing the happiness JW stated 
she felt after participating in their apology program).   
 158 See Kachalia et al., supra note 92, at 220 (attributing a substantial proportion of 
reduced litigation costs at UMHS to reduced claims processing times); Kraman & Hamm, 
supra note 24, at 966 (explaining how local settlement allows the VA to avoid the “hidden 
expenses of litigation”). 
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for immediate settlement following an apology, as long as the 
patient certifies they have spoken with an attorney about their 
legal rights.  If the patient chooses not to seek counsel, they 
should be required to have a cooling off period of six months 
before settling any claim.  Use of this type of time period has 
been approved by the UMHS when the six months is a hiatus 
that prevents a patient from suing.159  Using the same reasoning 
as UMHS, it follows that one who wishes to accept a settlement 
as part of a disclosure program should likewise be given six 
months to think through their decision before making a 
permanent decision with potentially lifelong consequences on the 
patient and family. 
Another step to make claims processing faster, cheaper and 
more efficient would be for hospitals and insurers whose insured 
have committed a negligent error to provide injured patients 
with a simple, one page “Stipulation of Liability.”  This 
stipulation could be provided as soon as the initial meeting post-
incident between doctor and patient (and patient’s attorney, if 
desired by the patient).  The effect of the stipulation would be 
that the medical provider would be admitting to being at fault 
and having caused the patient’s damages.  The stipulation would 
be accompanied by a request for either a jury trial on the limited 
issue of the patient’s damages, or an assessment of damages 
hearing in which a judge determines the patient’s damages. 
The stipulation would benefit the medical provider’s insurer 
because it would save the expense of pre-trial litigation (attorney 
fees, expert opinions on the issue of liability, deposition 
transcript costs, etc.), and would allow for a more efficient 
processing of the case, with the only issue requiring 
determination being the amount of the patient’s damages.  It 
would also be ethically sound: it would be a recognition of 
responsibility and a willingness to participate in our society’s 
mechanism for deciding how to determine the cost to accompany 
that responsibility. 
 
 159 Among the reasons stated by the UMHS hospital’s website for the success of their 
disclosure program are: 
We’re fortunate to be located in Michigan, a state that passed sensible medical 
malpractice reform in the 1990s and is not having some of the same crisis 
situations as other states.  Our state law, among other things, builds a six-
month “cooling off” period into the malpractice lawsuit process.  If a patient is 
thinking about bringing suit against a doctor or hospital for medical 
malpractice, the patient must first alert prospective defendants of their 
complaints with a “notice of intent,” and both parties then have six months to 
consider their cases before going to court. 
Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety at UMHS, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS. (last visited 
July 25, 2011), http://www.med.umich.edu/news/newsroom/mm.htm [hereinafter U. OF 
MICH. HEALTH SYS.]. 
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C. Closing COPIC-Style Loopholes 
Any time a patient resolves a case as part of an 
apology/disclosure process, even if it’s framed as a “no-fault” 
program like COPIC’s 3Rs program, the provider should still be 
required to report the act of malpractice.  The databases 
associated with malpractice claims serve a critical public safety 
purpose to inform patients (and licensing authorities) of whether 
providers are negligent in their care.  That a doctor could escape 
this because he or she was able to convince a patient not to 
litigate an otherwise viable malpractice claim not only is a 
disservice to the public in general, but serves as motivation for 
the negligent medical provider to inappropriately press the 
harmed patient into settling. 
D. Repealing Apology Shield Laws 
Finally, medical apology shield laws should be repealed.  
Although the anecdotal evidence indicates that for an attorney to 
actually attempt to use an admission of fault against a physician 
at trial would be detrimental to a case against that doctor,160 that 
does not change the fact that doctors should play by the same set 
of rules as all other people.161  This change would mean that a 
doctor’s apology or admission against interest, as a norm, is 
admissible.  This is simply the same default standard as exists 
for an attorney who admits malpractice to a client or a driver 
that admits negligent driving to the person he hit.   
CONCLUSION 
In concluding this Article, it is important to point out three 
things that it did not argue.  First, it did not argue that patients 
must, or even should, pursue a malpractice claim against a 
doctor that has treated them carelessly and caused them injury.  
Adults can, and should, be expected to make responsible 
decisions about the benefits and disadvantages of pursuing a 
 
 160 TRUOG ET AL., supra note 10, at 46 (citations omitted) (“As the president of the 
South Carolina Trial Association stated in testimony before the South Carolina Senate, ‘I 
would never introduce a doctor’s apology in court.  It is my job to make a doctor look bad 
in front of a jury, and telling the jury the doctor apologized and tried to do the right thing 
kills my case.’”). 
 161 See generally Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve Said I’m Sorry, 
Haven’t I?”  A Study of the Identity Implications and Constraints that Apologies Create for 
their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10, 15 (2004) (demonstrating victims who reject 
apologies are viewed less sympathetically by third parties).  Advocates justify tort 
reforms, such as apology laws, by claiming those laws will reduce the cost of medical 
malpractice insurance, but the laws have not had that effect; instead, they appear more 
closely linked to helping insurance companies cover losses sustained in stock market 
speculation. See June Smith Tyler, Medical Malpractice Statutes: Special Protection for a 
Privileged Few?, 12 N. KY. L. REV 295, 299–303 (1985). 
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legal course of action, just as they should make educated, 
informed medical decisions.  The problem, this Article argues, is 
that the current model for apology programs is designed to make 
it harder for patients to reach these reasonable, informed 
decisions.  This need not be the situation; there are simple, fair 
fixes to the problem created by apology programs to prevent 
parties responsible to pay for the damages caused by malpractice 
to victimize patients by convincing them not to pursue claims 
that their insurers would have to pay.  To correct this problem, 
this Article argued that malpractice victims require simple 
protections that even the playing field.   
Second, this Article did not accept the insurance industry’s 
invented definitions of “fair” and “reasonable” compensation.  
The medical insurance literature on apology programs is replete 
with examples of what those who have to pay claims believe to be 
“fair,” followed by language indicating that their definitions 
simply do not correspond with what our legal system has defined 
as the appropriate measure of damages, assuming a plaintiff can 
prove malpractice.162  Instead, the literature reflects an imagined 
system of tort damages that delegitimizes the availability of non-
economic damages, and perhaps, even more expensive measures 
of economic damages.  This is not an article that argues about 
whether the legal system currently assesses damages the “right” 
way.  Instead, it accepts that full and fair damages are as defined 
by courts and applied by juries.163  Therefore, this article accepts 
the commonly accepted and current legal definition of “fair” and 
“reasonable” compensation, which requires that tort victims be 
compensated with all of the economic and non-economic damages 
sufficient to make the injured plaintiff “whole.” 
Third, and finally, this Article did not argue that doctors are 
the “bad guys.”  Just the opposite: it is intended to expose the 
actual motivation behind medical disclosure policies—insurers’ 
desire to keep more money for themselves and give less to 
 
 162 See, e.g., Steve S. Kraman, Proactive Reporting, Investigation, Disclosure, and 
Remedying of Medical Errors Leads to Similar or Lower than Average Malpractice Claim 
Costs, AHRQ HEALTH CARE INNOVATIONS EXCHANGE (last visited July 25, 2011), 
http://innovations.ahrq.gov/content.aspx?id=2731 (“[After disclosure, Kentucky VA] 
hospital representatives offer to provide corrective medical or surgical treatment, assist 
the patient/family in filing for needed services associated with any disability resulting 
from medical care, and/or present an offer of monetary compensation.  The respective 
attorneys negotiate to reach a fair settlement based on a reasonable calculation of loss.”);; 
U. OF MICH. HEALTH SYS., supra note 159 (“If we have concluded that our care was 
unreasonable, we say so—and we apologize.  If our care caused an injury, we work with 
the patient and his/her counsel to reach mutual agreement about a resolution.  This 
doesn’t always mean a settlement, but if it does, we compensate quickly and fairly.”). 
 163 See supra notes 138–148 and accompanying text (describing full and fair 
compensation under the tort system). 
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patients—and to suggest ways to reform the process to meet the 
needs of improving doctor-patient communication while 
providing injured patients with an appropriate, compassionate, 
and fair opportunity to receive compensation in the event of an 
unwanted outcome.  Rather than demonize doctors, it is hoped 
that medical providers will read this Article, recognize the 
disservice that their insurers are asking them to commit against 
their patients, and revolt against it.  By allowing the legal 
process to go forward after an apology, doctors can then know 
that they are putting patients in the best position possible to 
recover from a medical error.   
Disclosure programs put in place by insurance companies 
and self-insured hospitals put their own interests in front of both 
patients and providers alike.  For example, consider the 
guidelines provided to doctors by CRICO/RMF to its physicians 
when an error occurs: 
In cases that are clear-cut and where an objectively visible error has 
occurred, apologies should be made.  Some institutions refer to these 
as “The Wrongs”: wrong patient; wrong digit/limb/organ; wrong 
drug/dose/method of administration; wrong procedure, etc.  If a doctor, 
assisted by the institutional risk manager, can clearly determine that 
the unanticipated outcome has been caused by one of these “wrongs”, 
[sic] an immediate apology should be made.  However, it should be 
emphasized that physicians should not make this determination on 
their own.  They should immediately contact their risk manager, lay 
out every known fact, and then let the risk manager serve as their 
expert.164 
The assertions are both remarkable and insulting to the 
physicians expected to carry them out: it is CRICO/RMF’s 
position that even if a doctor accidentally cuts off the wrong limb 
of a patient, that doctor cannot determine if his or her act was an 
error.  Can one seriously believe that CRICO/RMF’s risk 
managers believe that they know better than a provider if they 
have made an error?  Instead, language like the above suggests 
what insurers really want when dealing with their physicians: 
control.  When a doctor submits to the insurer’s control, in turn, 
it allows the insurer to instruct the doctor on how to talk to their 
patients to steer them away from seeking compensation for their 
injuries.  While no doctor wants a malpractice claim on his or her 
record, it is also hard to imagine any doctor that pays for 
malpractice insurance would want his or her injured patient to 
be shortchanged by the insurer to whom they pay premiums (let 
alone that the doctor that made the error would want to be the 
 
 164 CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2. 
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insurance company’s tool to convince the patient that their injury 
should not be compensated). 
Those that have to pay malpractice claims have a conflict of 
interest with physicians: the risk manager’s obligation is to the 
insurance company, whereas the physician’s obligation is to the 
patient.  Even those who have written strongly in favor of 
apology programs, like Dr. Steve Kraman and Ginny Hamm, note 
that this phenomenon is inherent to risk management.  By their 
definition, “risk management usually refers to self-protective 
activities meant to prevent real or potential threats of financial 
loss due to accident, injury, or medical malpractice.  When a 
malpractice claim is made against an institution in the private 
sector, risk managers coordinate the defense against patients, 
their dependents, and their attorneys.”165 
When insurance companies, or the internal risk managers at 
a hospital who are in league with the insurers, use their 
influence over physicians to encourage apology as a means of 
maximizing their own profits, they taint the physician’s 
responsibility to the patient.  Without corporate concerns about 
compensating patients, insurance companies and risk managers 
would not publish elaborate guidance to their doctors explaining 
sophisticated policies about how to apologize.166  Doctors would 
not need to seek approval of a risk manager before admitting an 
error to a patient that has just suffered from a “never event” at 
their hands.167  This Article seeks to cut doctors out of the 
hypocrisy by allowing them to offer a sincere, no-strings-attached 
apology after an act of malpractice that leaves the legal effects of 
 
 165 Kraman & Hamm, supra note 24, at 963 (emphasis omitted). 
 166 See, e.g., CRICO’s Perspective, supra note 2.  See also MASS. COAL. FOR  
THE PREVENTION OF MED. ERRORS, WHEN THINGS GO WRONG: RESPONDING TO  
ADVERSE EVENTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.macoalition.org/documents/ 
respondingToAdverseEvents.pdf (providing advice regarding “The Patient and Family 
Experience”;; “The Caregiver Experience”;; and “Management of the Event”);; Am. Soc’y for 
Healthcare Risk Mgmt., Disclosure: What Works Now & What Can Work Even Better, 24 
J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 19 (2004) (“The next step in better communication with 
patients”;; “Creating an effective patient communication polity”;; and “What works now 
and what can work even better.”).  Furthermore, a cottage industry of private companies 
has sprung up offering guidance and seminars to physicians instructing exactly what to 
say, when to say it, under what circumstances, and in what setting.  These programs are 
designed to minimize the possibility the disclosure might instigate, rather than prevent, 
litigation. See, e.g., TRUOG ET AL., supra note 10; WOJCIESZAK, supra note 125; WOODS, 
supra note 127. 
 167 Doctors deliver apologies, but they are trained to carefully plan their words in 
concert with their risk manager. See, e.g., Disclosure, CRICO/RMF (last visited Sept. 27, 
2011), http://www.rmf.harvard.edu/education-interventions/materials-for-instructors/ 
disclosure/disclosure-support-materials.aspx.  A “never event” is a term used by the 
National Quality Forum (NQF) to describe particularly shocking medical errors (such as 
wrong-site surgery) that should never occur. Never Events, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (July 13, 2011), http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=3. 
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that to the insurance company to whom the doctor pays 
premiums for just such a purpose. 
The shame is that medical apology programs could be a 
positive thing.  Saving on psychological stress and anguish of the 
patient and physician, lowering attorneys’ fees and litigation 
costs, and lightening burdens on already overwhelmed court 
systems are all laudable goals.  Using power differentials and 
taking advantage of harmed patients to increase profits are not.  
Some commentators have argued that doctors are fiduciaries of 
their patients, thus owing them the highest possible duty to 
protect their interests.168  Some courts have even ruled as such.169  
We should take seriously the idea that doctors owe their primary 
allegiance to their patients; not just in making medical decisions, 
but in any and all decisions relating to their relationship.  In 
their White Paper on disclosing malpractice, the Massachusetts 
Coalition for the Protection of Medical Errors suggested that, 
when approaching these issues, it should be done from the 
patient’s point of view.170  They asked, “What would I want if I 
were harmed by my treatment?” and “[W]hat is the right thing to 
do?”171 
This Article stands for that idea that doing the “right thing” 
for patients requires something more than convincing them not 
to seek compensation through litigation for injuries caused by 
negligent errors.  Adults can, and should, be expected to make 
serious decisions about whether to pursue legal claims that they 
are entitled to make.  If an injured patient, after soberly 
considering the options, decides not to pursue a claim, then that 
is a perfectly acceptable result.  However, in situations where a 
 
 168 See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: 
Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 
526 (2009) (suggesting physicians’ fiduciary duties obligate them to avoid effects of 
medical manufacturers’ marketing).  See also Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. 
Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say No” if an 
“Informed” Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 335, 374 (2009) (suggesting physicians’ fiduciary duty includes obligation to deny 
patients’ requests for medically unnecessary services).  As one commentator noted, “[s]o 
long as doctors continue to claim the mantle of professional and not mere business 
contractor, they are privileged by the trust invested in them by patients, and also 
burdened by the duty of loyalty and devotion to patient welfare above their own that their 
status as fiduciaries entails.” Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 331, 350–51 (2008). 
 169 See, e.g., Emmet v. E. Dispensary and Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (finding a fiduciary relationship exists between physicians and patients); Hahn v. 
Mirda, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (2007) (recognizing California courts have “repeatedly” 
recognized the physician/patient relationship as a fiduciary one); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 
P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (explaining that the doctrine of informed consent springs from 
the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient). 
 170 MASS. COAL. FOR THE PREVENTION OF MED. ERRORS, supra note 137, at 3. 
 171 Id. 
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person is injured and scared, the medical industry should find 
ways to give them an opportunity to make educated decisions 
and not take advantage of their weakened state. 
 
 
